Interview with Henry Gosho

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HENRY (HANK) GOSHO

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Q: I'm going to ask Hank to lead off by simply giving a short biographical sketch of his background and education. Then if you have something to say about your war experiences, even though they're not directly related to USIA, it will be interesting. And finally, what it was that brought you into the US Information Agency

Biosketch

GOSHO: I was born in Seattle, Washington, on February 4, 1921. I went as far as the fifth grade in grade school in Seattle. My father, a pharmacist, had his own drugstore in Seattle; we were a family of three boys and one girl, but he had a dream of starting a US-Japan pharmaceutical import-export company. He had the foresight to see that the boys should learn Japanese in order to make his project a success. So he sent all three of us to Japan to be educated. I finished grade school, high school and two years of college in Japan.

I was in my second year of college when my father, in early 1941, decided that things were getting a little dicey between our two countries, and so he thought that one of the three boys ought to come back. My older brother was doing well in a chemical engineering

course at Waseda University; my younger brother was enrolled in a medical college in Okayama. I was enrolled in an international relations course at a Methodist Christian school called Dwansei Gakuin. My father didn't know about my school but he thought that the other two probably had a better academic chance, so he asked that I come back. As it turned out, I came back on the last boat, which was in September of 1941. Then three months later, the war broke out. I later learned that my older brother was drafted into the Japanese Navy, and my younger brother was an intern in the Japanese Army Medical Corps.

As you know, subsequently all Japanese, including aliens and American citizens, were evacuated from the West Coast. I was interned first at Puyallup, Washington, and then moved to Twin Falls, Idaho. It was called the Minidoka Relocation Center.

Before that, however, I tried to enlist in the Army, but failed that. The Navy wouldn't take Japanese-Americans. Of course, we didn't have an Air Force in those days. But soon after the war broke out, all Japanese were declared by the Selective Service as 4C, which I learned was a classification for undesirable personnel or enemy aliens. Well, the only reason I bring this up is that while we were interned, the War Department in Washington discovered that in this war against Japan, they needed Japanese linguists for Army intelligence. So they came out to these internment camps.

Military Service with Merrill's Maraudersin Burma

To make a long story short, I was asked if I would be interested in serving in the Army intelligence. I pointed out that, "I'd be willing to do so, but I have a Selective Service draft rating of 4C, which means undesirable or enemy alien. What are you going to do about that?" (Laughs)

The War Department found the solution by indicating that "if you volunteer, why, then it's okay!!"

All this is related to my getting into USIA, because I volunteered for combat duty in Burma with Merrill's Marauders, at which time I met John Emmerson, a Foreign Service officer, who was assigned to General Stilwell's headquarters as the political advisor. When John Emmerson left the area in 1944, he said to me, "If you're ever in Washington, look me up, and maybe we can get you into the Foreign Service if you're interested."

I said, "Well, I'm interested," even though I knew that at the time, the State Department did not employ Japanese-Americans.

1946: Post-War - Enters State Department 1960: Transfers to VOA

He said, "Well, maybe this war will change all that. But if you're ever in Washington, look me up." And I did. And he endorsed my application to the State Department.

I was assigned to the Japan desk of what was called the Foreign Activity Correlation Division, called FC. I was there from 1946 through the beginning of 1950. In those days, the Voice of America was under the State DepartmentIn 1950, it was decided that they would start a Japanese language program, and they decided that I should be detailed to New York to help set up and oversee the Japanese program. Sax Bradford was then the chief of FC, and Herman Barger was the deputy.

Process of Getting into USIA

I was in New York, and it soon became evident after several testings of those Japanese living in the US, that announcing Japanese was a professional job, and you needed someone who knew professional radio broadcasting. So I was sent to Japan to recruit announcers from NHK. Sax Bradford, when I arrived in Japan, was the PAO. Olcott Deming was the deputy. They asked if I'd be interested in coming to Tokyo as a FSSO. We were then a part of the diplomatic section under GHQ SCAP, and Sax was the head

of the information unit. George Atkinson was designated what we would now call the ambassador. Then he died in a plane crash, and then William Sebald took over.

I was interviewed by William Sebald, Director of the Diplomatic Section, who said, "I understand you fought against the Japanese during the war."

I said, "Well, yes, I did. That's right."

He said, "Well, that may present a problem, because we submit all the names to the Foreign Office, and if they find out that you were involved in the war against them, they may turn you down."

I said, "Well, if that happens, that's what happens." But Sax Bradford and John Emmerson went to work on it, as did Olcott Deming, and eventually the State Department agreed to process my "papers."

So they submitted my name. The Foreign Office approved, and so I was getting ready to be transferred to Tokyo from New York, when they discovered that Jeanne, my wife, was born in Japan and was an alien. (Laughs) There was no way that you could get citizenship at that time. This was 1951. It wasn't until 1954 that the Walter McCarran — I've forgotten the other part — Act passed and State immediately processed her papers. But before that, I was assigned to Tokyo on a six-month basis.

I guess it was during that era, when the peace treaty was signed, the diplomatic section was abolished, MacArthur vacated the residence and the chancery, as we knew it, and we became USIA.

Q: I can give you a little background there. When I first joined it, it was USIE, which meant the US Information and Education Agency.

GOSHO: That's right.

Q: Shortly thereafter, they decided it wasn't being handled too well, so they got a fellow by the name of Charlie Hulten to come in. He was to be the General Manager. He was still to operate under the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, but they changed the name to the International Information Administration under State Department, and it became IIA. Charlie Hulten took over as General Manager, and I think at that time Ed Barrett came in as the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs. That was the way it stood when Eisenhower was elected. Then, of course, on August 1, 1953, he issued the famous Executive Order that made USIA separate from the Department of State. So that was the genesis of USIA. However, as soon as we got out from under the SCAP, we became USIS in Japan. All through these other permutations of naming, we remained USIS and are still USIS today, except for that one 4-year interlude when they made everybody USICA a few years ago.

GOSHO: Then we became USIA in 1953. Then we became FSIOs. Up until that time, we were all FSSs.

Q: Yes, FSSs or FSRs.

Gosho Regularly Assigned to USIS Tokyo, 1954

GOSHO: Right. My first job, while we were still FSSs, with USIS was as Radio Officer, primarily because I was with VOA. Just about that time, the commercial radio started out in Japan. Up until that time, everything was run by NHK, the quasi-government radio organization. Nobody thought that commercial radio would ever catch on in Japan, but Radio Tokyo, which started out, came to USIS and asked for assistance. Victor Hauge was then the chief of the radio branch.

Q: Do you remember exactly what date it was that you arrived in Tokyo? I had come out a short time before you arrived, and I can't remember just when it was you came. When you came to be actually assigned to USIS or its predecessor.

GOSHO: I first came to Tokyo to recruit the announcers, and then stayed on for six months. That was in the summer of 1950. But I think what you're talking about is when Jeanne finally got her citizenship. That would be June of 1954.

Q: I'd forgotten it was that late in the game. I remember Sax Bradford talking about you and saying, "As soon as we can get Hank cleared, we'll get him out here." But I didn't remember when it was that you actually showed up. I came in January of '52 and handled the nuts and bolts of the takeover from the Army when the program converted to USIS. We had 24 field centers, about 840 Japanese and 135 American positions authorized. We never filled them all, but we did get about 100 on duty before Washington ordered us to start cutting back.

GOSHO: I remember when I was first assigned there on TDY in 1950, USIS was in the Mitsui Bank building. Then we moved to the Mitsubishi Shoji building. Then from there to the Mantetsu building. I guess that was over a span of some 15 years.

Q: When I came out in January of 1952, we were in the Mitsubishi Shoji building near the Tokyo Station.

GOSHO: There was one more before that. We were in the Mitsui Bank building.

Q: Then we moved to the Mantetsu. I've forgotten now whether it was late fall of 1952 or the early part of 1953, but it was right in that two-or three-month period. We moved up either around November of '52 or sometime the first month or two of '53. By the time you came out on assignment, we were already in the Mantetsu building.

USIS Able to Saturate Japanese Radio with ItsLocally Produced Programs in Mid-1950's

GOSHO: That's right. As I mentioned, Victor Hauge was the chief of the radio branch. Vic had already embarked on an ambitious radio program project. The plan was to furnish the commercial stations with USIS radio programs that they could use in the early days,

because there was nobody that would sponsor any of the time slots, mainly because Japanese businesses were not familiar with business of sponsorship.

Q: And — they didn't have much money.

GOSHO: They didn't have much money. But Vic Hauge saw this as an excellent opportunity to get our message across through the radio programs that we would furnish them free. We started out, as I recall, with two or three programs. One I remember was called "Family Album," which was a program that talked about household hints, how things were done in the US, how it might work in Japan. It was an excellent way, I thought, to get our American message to the Japanese. A lot of the letters that we received showed that there were listeners.

It was an ideal situation, as you might guess, because there was a lack of sponsors in Japan, we were able to get USIS radio programs on the air in prime time, which was, in those days, between 6:00 and 9:30.

Q: As I recall, at that time there were no networks in Japan at all. You were dealing with a group of independent stations, and therefore had to deliver your taped programs to stations all over the country, each one of which played individually. They were all pretty low-power stations.

GOSHO: Yes, that's right. Radio Tokyo was the first commercial station in Japan, followed by Osaka, then by Nagoya, and then eventually into Fukuoka, and up to Hokkaido. We were fortunate in that in each of those major cities, we had a cultural center. So that the cultural center director was able to make contact with the radio station and establish a relationship, which helped in carrying out the cultural center activities in his own area.

Eventually, the radio stations formed networks. Primarily they were owned by the Asahi newspaper organization, which had one network. The Mainichi newspaper had another

network, and the Yomiuri, the third. Those are the three main media newspapers in Japan. These later on branched out into TV.

Our programs were made up of a mix of music, "Family Album," which was more of a home aid type of program, but we would weave USIS country objectives into the program. We also had what we would call talk shows. I think there were two or three what we called commentary talk shows.

One on which we put a lot of emphasis was a military program for which we were able to utilize a prominent military commentator who would talk about the security pact, what it intended to do and what it hoped to do, but mainly to keep the peace. We would receive letters from audiences. Not all were in favor of what was being said, but nonetheless, we thought that it was worthwhile, in that at least it got the people thinking about the security pact and what it meant to Japan.

On another commentary program, we invited former Washington correspondents or New York correspondents who were the Asahi or Mainichi or Yomiuri correspondents, and they would talk about international politics, relating mainly to US and Japan affairs.

Another commentary program was a US-Japan economic talk show. We were able to place these programs initially on prime-time programs.

Q: You talked about the feedback on the military programs. Did you get any feedback on the correspondents' program and the economic program that you were putting on?

GOSHO: We received many comments on the current topic programs mostly that they appreciated the program and they enjoyed it. But I think that that was mostly because they were able to read in their own local newspapers on current topics or current events. But on the economic programs, we would receive comments that there were some aspects in it that they hadn't realized, and they thanked us for the educational info that was being provided.

Of course, the most popular shows were the music shows. We had country and western, which was very popular at the time. I wasn't much of a country and western fan, but there were quite a few in Japan, strangely enough because at that time square dancing was very popular. That went across great, and we got quite a few requests for that type of music. Although we did have classical music, such as the Boston Symphony. Those were very popular, so popular, in fact, that we got a request from Suntory Whiskey Company that they wanted to sponsor one of the shows. We thought, "Gee, that would be terrific." So we sent a message to Washington, but the legal beagle said no, an alcoholic beverage program would not be appropriate, besides which they advised that a US Government-operated program could not be commercially sponsored. So that one went by the wayside.

There was, as I recall, a JTB (Japan Travel Bureau) or similar organization that did sponsor one of our shows without our knowing it. The program had to do with a tour of the United States, that would do a show about the Grand Canyon or about national parks or about various cities, and how they were related to Japan, so on and so forth.

Q: I think you mentioned at one point in our conversation before we were recording, that you would occasionally put on shows that would review or report on certain articles that appeared in major US periodicals, and some of them in the medical field, which got a great response.

GOSHO: Yes, In the program called 'Family Album,' we would from time to time insert either new findings or interesting findings by the American medical field, either an article out of the AMA journal or the Harvard medical journal. I've forgotten which it was. But quite often we would receive inquiries from a medical college in Japan, saying that they heard the program and could we furnish them with more detailed data on it. In many cases, we were able to furnish them with additional data, and if we couldn't, we would write them and tell them that we were looking further into their request. This was one of those things you call evidence of effectiveness.

Later-Near 1960: Commercial Sponsorship Begins; USIS is Pushed Out of Prime-Time

At the height of the radio branch operation, we had between 30 and 40 programs, the majority of which were on prime time. But as the years went by, commercial sponsorship caught on. I would guess around seven or eight years later, we began to get pushed out of prime-time programming. But interestingly enough, the stations would make another effort to ask us if they could only sponsor "Family Album," for instance, saying they could still carry it on in prime time. But since that was impossible, it would be shoved back to, say, around 1:00 at night, and eventually midnight. Pretty soon, the only time we were on the air was 1:00 in the morning and 4:00 in the morning.

Q: When you were in your heyday and furnishing all these programs to individual stations, did you have "traveling salesmen" who would go out and make contact with the various radio stations first to get them acclimated to taking your product, and later perhaps to getting a feedback from then as to what they wanted?

GOSHO: We had a system where if I didn't go out, then our top FSL or local employee would go out with, let's say, three or four sample programs. Maybe two tapes would be music tapes. That was a good come-on, because good music programs in those early days were hard to come by in Japan. The prime program that you really wanted to sell was either a commentary or "Family Album". In most cases, they knew that if they picked one or both music programs, they were, more or less, obliged to take the talk show or the commentary program.

Q: At the height of utilization of your programs around Japan, approximately how many stations were you servicing? What is your evaluation, overall, of that earlier period, say the first five or six years that you were on the air through so many Japanese stations, as to the influence the programs had?

GOSHO: When we first started out, there were only three or four stations, but at the peak, we serviced in the neighborhood of 60 to 70 stations. In fact I would have to say that it was probably higher, because when you got into the hinterlands of Japan, as you know, it's a mountainous island, they had there what they called slave stations. So if Nagoya carried a program, it was generally also carried by the slave station, which would be maybe as many as three or four additional. So we probably serviced, at the peak moments, about 100 stations.

When television came in, I would guess about 1958-59, we started out with three or four programs, and ended up with three or four programs. Of those three, two were English conversation-type programs.

Q: Teaching?

GOSHO: Yes, teaching. One was just pure elementary English, but the other one, we used VOA's Special English material which enjoyed some success. The other two were documentaries which were furnished by the Agency's TV and MOPIX Service. But, you know, television caught on very fast in Japan. By that time, commercial sponsorship was making rapid headway, so there was not much need by the Japanese to depend on us for furnishing material.

Q: Other than the correspondence you received as a result of your programs, did you have any kind of an indication that you were making some headway with messages in the programming that you were preparing?

GOSHO: In a negative sense, and yet the fact that we got some negative responses to it, it was an indication that they were listening. We had a military program, not in the sense of warfare or defense — well, it had to do with Japanese defense, but we had a military commentator who, interestingly enough, we were able to get from the Asahi newspaper, whose policy at the time was generally anti-American. By anti-American, I would say

they were more pro-Japanese than they were anti-American. But we were able to get a military editor, who would talk about the nuclear protective aspects of visiting submarines or nuclear aircraft carriers. The Japanese were Hiroshima conscious, and so anything that had to do with nukes, they were against. But this military commentator tried to inform them of just what it was that the US-Japan defense was doing. As I say, not all the letters we got in that connection were favorable; a lot of them protested trying to justify nuclear weapons. But at least, as I say, it showed they were listening to the program.

USIS Arranges to Broadcast World Series to Japan

Q: It seems to me that at one time USIS was arranging to broadcast World Series games. Tell me how that came about and what role you played in that.

GOSHO: (Laughs) That was before I was assigned at Tokyo. It occurred to me that even before the war, baseball was extremely popular in Japan. Probably, next to sumo, it was considered the national pastime. But because of that, I suggested to the Agency — well, at the time it was in State — I put in a proposal, which was approved, that we broadcast the World Series in Japanese to Japan. As it happened, I had gone to Japan earlier to recruit three NHK announcers, two of which happened to be sports announcers, so we were well prepared. I did the color commentary on it. Broadcasting a World Series was a great thrill to me, because I played baseball in high school in Japan, and it had always been my dream to see a World Series. Here I got the opportunity to do so.

One of the highlights of the World Series was when I conducted an interview with Casey Stengal, manager of the New York Yankees. I had asked him whether he foresaw a day when they would have a real World Series with the champion of America playing the champion of Japan. His response was, "You know, I went to Japan in 1934 with Babe Ruth, and now there was a great player." He talked about Babe Ruth, and he said that Babe Ruth had gone to England. "Now, England, that's a different situation. Baseball is not all that popular in Europe, but eventually there will be a day when baseball will become

popular." He switched from one topic to another so rapidly, in the blink of an eyelash, that I had a great deal of trouble interpreting what he said, Nonetheless, it went out over the air.

About two weeks later, we got several letters from Japan, saying, "We couldn't understand a word of what that interpreter was saying." Well, what the heck. I couldn't understand a word of what Casey was trying to say either.

The significance, though, of that World Series was that we got reports from USIS Tokyo that there was an estimated audience of between 5 to 7 million who heard all seven games. That was one of the highlights of radio broadcasting, even in Japan, as the first broadcast in Japanese. Of course, today the Japanese are here not only broadcasting the World Series, but the Super Bowl, as well.

USIS Trained Many Young Japanese Who Later BecameAnnouncers on Japanese Radio Stations or Networks

Another sidebar on the radio branch operation in Tokyo was that we had several local radio producers who were just starting out. In other words, they graduated from university and they'd apply for a job at USIS, and we would take them on as assistants to the main producer. Later, as Agency budget cuts came, they would move on to Japanese radio stations. Eventually we had quite a large alumni group of former USIS radio branch employees who were working for various radio stations throughout Japan. We were invited to attend what the Japanese called the NARB, the National Association of Radio Broadcasters, patterned after the NARB here in the States. It was like old home week. I would go and be greeted by these various former workers of USIS.

Radio/TV Phase Down: Gosho Becomes Chief ofInformation Division, USIS Tokyo

Eventually the radio and TV programs sort of faded out, and more emphasis was put on the information side. USIS was divided into the Information Division and the Cultural Division. I was assigned to head up the Information Division, made up of Radio/TV,

MOPIX, Publications, and Exhibits Branches. My last assignment in Tokyo was Expo 1970 in Osaka. Although talking about expositions, I was called out of retirement in 1984 and 1985 to be the deputy commissioner of the US Pavilion at Tsukuba.

Planning for President Eisenhower's 1960 Visit to Japan

There are many memories of the long years spent in Tokyo. I guess one of the most memorable was in 1959, towards the end of the year, I'd say around November. Harry Keith, chief of the Mopix operation, and I were assigned full-time to the upcoming visit by President Eisenhower in Japan. It had been announced in October of 1959, that in 1960, President Eisenhower would schedule a visit to Japan and it would be the first time that a US President would visit Japan. So it was to be a big event. Harry Keith and I were on it seven days a week, 24 hours a day, practically, as were two from the Foreign Office. We worked as a team in submitting various suggested schedules to Washington.

The main difficulty was that we had to time everything down to the nth inch of what was to happen. For example, on the program there was a luncheon to be given at the Imperial Hotel. First of all, we had to submit the menu to Washington. The menu was approved. Then Harry Keith and I and the two from the Foreign Office, and two from the White House came, and we sat down in the Banquet Room at the Imperial Hotel and actually ate what was to be served to the President. Somehow or other, when dessert time came, the waiter brought out vanilla ice cream. We were just about to dig into it when the White House medical officer says, "No, no! We can't have that. There's too much cholesterol in it." So the ice cream had to be scrubbed.

As I say, everything had to be timed to the minute. The visit to the Mejii Shrine, the oldest shrine in Tokyo, was on the schedule. One of the problems there was that there were no telephones readily available. As you know, the President has to have at each station the ability to make direct contact with the Washington switchboard. As after a great deal of negotiations and whatnot, they were finally able to install one telephone just outside the

shrine admin office, much to the chagrin of the high priest who objected to it. That was my first experience with picking up a phone and having the White House switchboard come right on.

Q: As you remember, in our early days out there, we were reduced to radio telephone, and very often it was almost impossible to hold a conversation between Tokyo and Washington. On this occasion, what had they done to improve communications so that you had a much better connection?

GOSHO: The telephone at the shrine, for example, went directly to the switchboard at the embassy, and then the switchboard at the embassy went to the USAFJ, the US Army Forces in Japan, headquarters in Fuchu, I think it was, and their switchboard was able to patch right into the White House.

Everything wasn't work in preparing for the President's visit. As a "take-off" on the requirement of communicating at all times with Washington, we came up with a little skit where the President is in audience with the Emperor, and there's a familiar red pay phone installed right next to the throne. As the President is bowing, the phone rings. The Emperor picks up the phone and he says, "Hai." Then he hands the phone over to the President and says, "Its for you." (Laughs)

All the Planning Wasted: Riots Force Cancellation of Visit - June, 1960

The upshot of the whole thing, after all the months of preparation, papers after papers, Plan A, fair-weather schedule, Plan B, wet-weather schedules, and all these things where you had to measure things by the minute, by the second, the upshot was Mr. Hagerty, the President's press secretary, flew into Haneda airport two weeks before the President was scheduled to arrive. We had already had indications there was going to be trouble. There were quite a few demonstrations already going strong. I think it was for that reason that Mr. Hagerty flew into Tokyo to get a final reading. I believe the President was already in Okinawa, when Mr. Hagerty came in. You couldn't get into the airport because of

the demonstrators. I was there well in advance of Mr. Hagerty's arrival. The Japanese security officer in charge of Haneda airport came to me and said, "A US helicopter is on standby. He's flying in now. We would strongly recommend that Mr. Hagerty avoid the demonstrators and take the chopper and use that to get to the embassy."

So when Mr. Hagerty's plane arrived, I went up the ramp and I gave him the message. He just looked at me and said, "No American official is going to go in by the back door. I will use the embassy car and proceed that way."

Well, he got no more than a few blocks at the far end of the runway there, and the cars couldn't move because of the demonstrators. They were pounding the car with their placards. This was in June of 1960. It was hotter than hell.

Q: That was about the time we were due to renegotiate the Security treaty, as I recall.

GOSHO: That's right.

Q: Was that the basis for the rioting?

GOSHO: That was the basis. Well, at that stage it wasn't rioting yet, but there were protest demonstrations and creating just general havoc. As a matter of fact, I believe that in one of the demonstrations at the Diet, a high school girl was crushed to death. That caused further problems. That was also one of the reasons why Hagerty came in.

It was hot in those cars. The engines overheated, and we had all the windows closed, and they were pounding the car with these placards. I was in the car directly behind Ambassador [Douglas] MacArthur III and Mr. Hagerty. There was a knock on the window. I looked out, and there was the chief of the security forces. I lowered the window, and he said, "I want you to go tell Ambassador MacArthur that your US Army chopper is going to hover over the cars. When I give the signal, they're going to lower a rope ladder. When I

give the signal, I would like to have the ambassador and Mr. Hagerty get out of the car and climb up the rope ladder and take off."

I said, "You're out of your cotton-picking mind! You don't want me to go out in that crowd, do you?" (Laughs)

He said, "Well, I can't do it. I don't speak English!!"

I finally said, "Okay." As I got out of the car, I got hit in the head with one of the demonstrator's placards, and I turned around, more in pain rather than anger, and this Japanese fellow that hit me on the head with the placard bowed low and said, "Excuse me. Sorry about that." (Laughs) Out of that emotional bit, there's that little bit of to-do that remained in my mind.

I went up to the car and told the ambassador what was going to happen. When the signal was given, they came out of the car. But as you know, when you're standing directly under a chopper, it raises a dust storm the likes you've never seen before, especially when it's so low. They got out and climbed up the rope ladder into the chopper, and it took off. As soon as the chopper took off and the main object of the demonstrators had gone, why, the crowd just disappeared, and we were able to proceed back to the embassy.

In the meantime, the chopper had landed at a place called Hardy Barracks, which is less than a mile away from the embassy. Mr. Hagerty and the ambassador drove directly through the back roads to the residence. When I arrived, Mr. Hagerty was chewing Ambassador MacArthur out for not providing the proper intelligence. (Laughs) I don't know what he could have done about it.

Q: Was it at that point that Hagerty decided that he was going to recommend the cancellation?

GOSHO: Yes. The President was in Okinawa, and they had the President go to Seoul. Prime Minister Kishi appeared tearfully on TV and announced that the President's visit had been canceled. I believe within the next day or so, Prime Minister Kishi resigned.

Value, or Lack Thereof, of American Diplomats Using Japanese Language in Official Meetings or Social Contacts.

Q: We were discussing earlier the value of use of Japanese language by American diplomats, and to some extent that it was counterproductive in certain instances.

GOSHO: First of all, I'd like to mention that the majority of my service was in Japan — I can only speak for Japan. Over the past several years I have found the Foreign Service officers' linguistic abilities to be top grade. Especially I found that those in USIS were of high caliber.

However, I have one observation to make, and I think it still applies. I remember an incident back in the days when USIS would invite the Japanese media for a get together, and almost the entire USIS staff and Japanese correspondents, foreign news editors, and so forth were invited. Mr. Watanabe of the Osaka Mainichi, chief of the foreign news desk, who was educated in the States, spoke excellent English, appeared at the cocktail party, as he always did. He was a great fan of USIS. As a matter of fact, come to think of it, Mr. Watanabe was one of those who appeared on our commentary programs in the early days. Anyway, he came to me towards the end of the party, a little bit upset, and said, "You know, one of your officers kept insisting on talking Japanese to me." He pointed him out.

I said, "Well, he's a recent graduate of the Yokohama Language School."

Mr. Watanabe said, "Well, since you and I are old friends, I can be frank with you. Every time I responded in English, he came back at me in his Japanese, which was not bad but not all that good. I think he should realize that when someone answers back in English,

that they should then droop the second language and respond in English, because it tells the person that his English isn't understandable, and it's a breach of etiquette." Also a breach of diplomacy, as far as that goes. So despite the fact that there are excellent linguists, there's always a time and place when they should respond in English if the guest talks to you or answers your questions or carries on a conversation in English.

Q: But on the whole, you feel that the diplomatic students speak a pretty good version of Japanese?

GOSHO: Yes.

Q: However, as we all know, the Japanese language is full of many nuances. To what extent do you think that a student in a couple years of study can pick up those nuances? Or do we miss an awful lot of them? Is that one of the great faults or inabilities in our language learning?

GOSHO: Yes. I can only speak for the Japanese language, but it is a language full of nuances, which is probably some of the reasons for many misunderstandings that arise between the US and Japan — the nuances of the language.

I recall in the early days, when Washington sent the post a message, asking that such and such be transmitted to the foreign Office, I accompanied the Ambassador to the Foreign Office. The message was transmitted. The Foreign Office official said, in Japanese, "I generally understand." "I got the gist," would be the more accurate translation. Except that the ambassador took it as an acceptance of the message.

We returned to the embassy, and a draft telegram was written that they had accepted. As the accompanying officer, I was required to initial the message. I said, "No, I don't think this is correct. What they actually said was they'll study it. It was not an acceptance." From that day forward, the ambassador agreed that henceforth anything official would be handled in the English language.

Q: I know that Sen Nishiyama, who, for general purposes I'll identify as the top local employee in the US Information Service operation, and who was born in the United States, got a degree in the US, and then went to Japan and lived there ever after, is probably the best example of a bilingual person that we have. But he and Reischauer used to get into some rather unpleasant arguments over the utilization of certain phrases in Japanese, and the ambassador would insist that the way he was saying it was the way it ought to be. Sen, in his very polite way, was trying to tell Reischauer that it really wasn't the way it should be said. I suppose that is due to the fact that the language had progressed since Reischauer learned it. Sen, of course, had been there all the time and knew all the current nuances.

GOSHO: I think that may have been true in the initial stages, but initially, it got quite a response from the audience. I recall that at one of the speeches he made, the ambassador had made a longer-than-normal talk in English before the translation. Normally he got to a convenient place so Sen could translate. But on that particular occasion, he had talked a little longer. Either that or he forgot that Sen had to translate it. Anyway, it was quite long. Sen translated it as best he could, and when Sen finished, the ambassador said, "Well, that wasn't exactly what I said. What I said was ..." and the ambassador started talking in Japanese. It brought much laughter, and a humorous air was interjected. So it became kind of an act, and it was a good one, because it showed the humorous side of the ambassador, and Sen realized it, too. They continued this "act" many more times.

But I agree. Sen, without a doubt, is the best interpreter of English into Japanese and vice versa that I've ever heard. He compares well with Mr. Shimanouchi, who was Prime Minister Kishi's personal secretary and interpreter. Mr. Shimanouchi spent his early years in Los Angeles and was educated at UCLA, so his English was perfect, too. When Prime Minister Kishi came to Washington as the first post-war high Japanese official to address the Congress, Mr. Shimanouchi, did the interpreting. When Prime Minister Kishi finished his speech and Mr. Shimanouchi ended with "Thank you very much." [I forgot to mention that Mr. Shimanouchi was a debater at UCLA, so his English language is flawless.], the

congressmen and senators came over and all shook Mr. Shimanouchi's hand, and sort of left the prime minister standing out in the cold. (Laughs)

Value of US Participation in International Fairs: Disappointed with US Exhibit at 1985 Tsukuba Fair

Q: I know that after you officially retired from the Agency, you were brought back a couple of times, largely to do the work on the preparation of the American Pavilion, at one or another of the international exhibitions, I think beginning with the Expo '70, and then later just two or three years ago. I'd like to get your impressions as to how you felt about the value of the US participation in these presentations, and what did it do for our relations with the Japanese? Do you have any feeling on that?

GOSHO: Yes. I think US participation in any international exposition, particularly in Japan, the US participation is always expected. I remember, as far back as 1970, we were having budget problems. Mr. Chernoff allowed as how the maximum he could get was \$9 million. Of course, \$9 million in 1970 was worth a lot more than it is now. Today that probably wouldn't get half as much as what we got in those days. I think the US participation is important and is highly desirable. But having said that, I think if you're not going to do it right, then don't do it, because I think we look bad when we put out a poor exhibit.

The main theme of the US Pavilion at the 1985 Tsukuba [Japan] Exposition was on Artificial Intelligence. For the most part, in my estimation, our exhibit was mediocre. I think we could have done much better. We had various American private industry participation, but, it was evident that they did not want to display any more than necessary to the Japanese, what progress was being made in the US. But in that respect, I think we could have done much better at Expo '85 with a much higher technological showing than was given. Every one of the Japanese high-tech industries, such as Fujitsu, IBM of Japan, and Sony, all said that what was exhibited in the US Pavilion they already knew. Some of it was already previously shown in Japan. So from that viewpoint, it was

a disappointment. But they said the mere fact that the US participated was part of the success of the exposition, and that if the US didn't participate, the local people would have considered it a failure.

Q: I think, of course, up until fairly recently, if the US appeared, as you said, there were great expectations, and perhaps expectations aroused beyond the level of our ability to produce. So if the US came in with anything less than the expectations, it was not as good a show as it should have been.

GOSHO: That's right.

Q: Now since the Japanese are ahead of us, it does become rather difficult sometimes, particularly in Japan. I guess it's safe to say that your evaluation is, as you said before, unless you're going to put on the very best that you have, you shouldn't do it at all. Pick a field in which you can come on strong and be the actual best in the world if you possibly can. Otherwise, don't do it.

GOSHO: That's right. Yes.

Q: So in your estimation, obviously the '85 show did not compare with the success of the '0 show.

GOSHO: No, it didn't. Although what made the 1970 exposition was the moon rock and the spaceship, the actual space vehicle.

Q: The smaller unit sent down to explore the surface.

GOSHO: Yes. It was timely, and there was no doubt that, by far, the moon rock made the 1970 exposition.

Q: In conclusion, is there any other comment you would like to make about the USIA programs abroad as you have seen them through your experience, and what they have accomplished?

GOSHO: Having gotten into USIA when it was born, then retired after USIA had firmly established itself, I think it has come of age in its overseas programs. In my travels since retirement I observed that the State Department has accepted USIS's role. Particularly they've come to realize that handling presidential visits or handling visits of high US officials is not something that anybody can do, but requires a professional knowledge. It's heartening to me to see that USIS and the Agency has arrived and has firmly establish itself.

Breaking Up USIA Would Be A Serious Mistake

Q: You're right. I don't know to what extent you are aware of it because you're not in the Washington area where it comes up all the time, but there is a systematic effort being made on the part of a number of people in Washington now to break up the Agency, return the information part of it to the State Department, who apparently wants it now!

GOSHO: Full cycle. (Laughs)

Q: Full cycle. To give the cultural aspect of it to some outfit like the Smithsonian Institution, and to make the Voice completely independent, an organization not responsible to anyone else. What would you say, for instance, if the State Department which now already has a public relations staff of about 150 people, attempted to take over something like a presidential visit abroad? Because to break up the Agency would remove the experienced USIS staff from overseas.

GOSHO: The inner workings of a presidential visit, for instance, requires a full knowledge of how the local media operates. It requires establishing good working relation-ships with the local press, with the local TV and with the local media in general. The regular

FSOs don't have that time. They're concentrating on politics, political and economic reports. Whereas with USIS, that's their job, as professionals, to establish a working relationship with the local media. It's that kind of contact that is so important in the making of a successful visit.

I think that, in this day and age, the need for and the importance of a Public Relations Program is understood by all. A Cultural Activity, I believe, also fits into this category. I think it would be a mistake to put the Information Program back into the State Department.

Looking at it from another angle. A selfish viewpoint. The situation may not exist today but in the past a State Department FSO in the "Public Affairs" or "Cultural" cone found promotions hard to come by. The reason being that the system seemed to lean towards and favor FSO's in the "Political" and "Economic" cones. The result would be that it would become difficult to get highly professional personnel to come into the program. They would shy away.

What Happened to the Two Gosho Brothers Who Went to Japanwith Hank for An Education in the 1930's?

Q: Early in this interview, you mentioned that your two brothers who had gone to Japan with you for educational purposes and did not return before Pearl Harbor as you did, had gone on to serve: one in the Japanese Navy and the other in the Japanese Army Medical Corps. I think it would be of interest to know what your brothers did after the War. I assume they stayed on in Japan, since for some years after the Armistice, Nisei who had even been in Japan when the War came, let alone served in the Japanese military forces, were denied continuance of American citizenship, and could not return. Did your brothers ever return to the US? To visit? To live? If they are still living, what are they doing now?

GOSHO: My older brother, having graduated from the Chemical Engineering Department of Waseda University in Tokyo, served in the Japanese Navy as a "Fuel Research Officer". He told me, after the War, that from the very beginning he was assigned, first, to the "Fuel

Research Office". Later, as the Pacific War began going downhill in 1943 and the need for fuel oil for the Japanese fleet became acute, he and many other Fuel Officers were assigned research on "Synthetic Oil". He told me with the double entendre that "it was a losing battle!!" He spent the entire War in Japan.

After the War he was employed by the C. Ito Trading Company in their Chemical Section. Later he became head of their Plastic Products Department. He retired in 1988 and now resides with his family in Takarazuka, Hyogo Prefecture.

My younger brother, while still enrolled in the Okayama Medical University, served parttime as a "medical trainee intern" with the Japanese Army Hospital in Okayama. He, also, spent the entire War in Okayama.

After the War he continued his studies at the Okayama Medical University but in 1946 [or '47] he was notified by the American Consulate in Osaka that his passport application for return to Seattle, Washington, had been approved. He finished his studies at the University of Washington's College of Pharmacy and joined our father in the Gosho Drug Company. He is now retired and resides in Bellevue, Washington.

POSTSCRIPT: I have been often asked the following question: Did the knowledge that you might face your brothers in combat worry you??"

My response was [1]; When I was in basic training at Camp Shelby, Mississippi; Army Intelligence training at Camp Savage, Minnesota and on the troop ship to Burma via India, the thought was constantly on my mind. But [2]; once in combat I was too occupied with the battle at hand and with "survival".

Q: Hank, this has been a very interesting interview, and I want to thank you very much for your participation in it.

GOSHO: You're welcome.

Q: We will send you a transcript, and you can add and delete or do anything that you want with it. Get it back to us, and we'll finish the draft after we've received your additions and/or changes.

End of interview